Iraq Troop Strength and Options

Should we pull out of Iraq, drawdown, or stay the course?

Divisive Force and Initial Troop Strength

Is the American presence the problem now? Should we have started with more forces to prevent insurgency at the beginning? What would that have caused?

I agree with the point that we are a divisive force in Iraq at this point. But I also think that our presence was always divisive and destined to ignite some reaction from zealots. I would also argue that the siren calls that we do not have and have not had enough troops in Iraq miss this point. Had we put 400,000 men in Iraq, we would have looked more like a conquering army intent to stay, perhaps igniting an insurgency with wider support. I think the problem with starting with a larger force is that (particularly in an election year) there would have been no opportunity to draw down without cries that we were cutting and running. I agree that at the beginning of the war having a pincer movement coming from Turkey may have been nice, but I don't see how it would have made a great difference today, and we found that it was not necessary for a quick resolution to the major combat formations. And it was not sustainable, and we would have run out of forces to rotate much sooner.Besides that this was unsustainable and cause more turmoil even had we been able to do it, it would have reduced the need for the Iraqi's to get it together and field their own forces, which is the only way this experiment has a chance of working.

So long as the US is there to do the heavy lifting, the Iraqis won't. When we are gone, they will have to.

I disagree with some that Fallujah was a disaster. I think this is the type of mission that we can and should do, while patrolling and policing are not. There is a hard core center to the insurgency that will have to be met with force. It would be better if Iraqis did it, but they are not capable of it and won't be for some time (at least not without being much more brutal and indiscriminate than we are). Leaving safe havens for insurgents to operate openly is demoralizing to the general population and makes it more difficult for the emerging government to claim any legitimacy. But the general policing and security can be done by the Iraqis.

I do agree that the neighboring countries do not want anarchy there after we leave (even if they want to make it as hard as possible while we are there to keep us out of their countries), and the sooner we pull out, the sooner those countries will have to step up to help Iraq survive, or face anarchy at home.

I suggest that we draw down to a force capable of defending Iraq against neighboring countries intent on taking land or revenge, and to do major operations like Fallujah, but leave all policing and security operations to the Iraqi forces. I would think 50,000 would do more than enough for this mission, and this would be sustainable for the long haul.


Comparison with other Occupations

One of the realities of this war is that since it was so bloodless during the invasion, so many potential insurgents survived. Contrasting with Germany or Japan (as all occupation discussions seem to have to do) where entire generations, especially young males, were decimated, the Iraqis just have a greater potential pool for insurgency. While presumably in the long run having those males available to rebuild the country and economy is in the interest of Iraq, it is in my opinion the main reason that the insurgency is so strong when compared historically.

Clearly there was a reasonable hope that by limiting the killing of the Army we would have an easier time "winning hearts and minds," and perhaps that was true (in that even today 80% of Iraqis seem to desire the emerging democracy). But having no men aged 15 to 30 would make insurgency pretty hard to sustain.

I am glad that we did not have to kill the entire Iraqi army in order to occupy, but in my mind this more than anything else left the insurgency so vital. It is also the future of our wars, I think, so learning to deal with the aftermath is a key lesson learned for going forward.


Leaving the Iraqi Military in Charge

I have read some articles about the professional military class in Iraq and how they would be effective in Iraq had we not disbanded the Army. Perhaps disbanding the army contributed to the current instability, but I am not sure that had we left the army intact that we would not be sitting here today saying that leaving this Baathist powerhouse intact is what prevented the Shiites from joining the government, rather than the minority Sunnis.

What is interesting about promoting the combat experience of any Iraqi force is that you have to look at that experience. Either they have experience with indiscriminate killing of civilians and destruction (either with Saddam or with the insurgents), or losing to Americans.

Whenever we pull out, we will be leaving behind a force that is only effective when it kills and destroys civilians but cannot fight actually trained and equipped forces. Even if the good guys end up winning, it will be extremely bloody, and there will be no attempt to avoid civilians.

The best we can hope for is to limit how bad that will be, but I suspect that after the elections the Shiites will take off the gloves, and the Sunnis will be run out.

Conclusion: Draw Down is best Option

I think we should reduce troop strength after the election to a force capable of protecting Iraq from outside forces, and to eliminate strongholds of Iraqi Insurgents when they are identified, but not so much that we are the defacto police force and face of the government. We should pull out of the cities and set up bases in the desert that are defensible without a lot of collateral damage. We should use our UAV's and air and helicopter support to help the Iraqi governmental forces, but reduce the number of American troops involved in ground warfare. I think this is the best aid we can give the Iraqi's, and maintain the reduced collateral damage that our style of warfare allows, while making the Iraqis do the heavy lifting of policing and security.